Structural Uncertainty and Central Bank Conservatism: The Ignorant Should Shut Their Eyes by Spagat, M & Rosal, M
Structural Uncertainty and Central Bank
Conservatism: The Ignorant Should Shut Their
Eyes
Joao Mauricio Rosal
Department of Economics
Royal Holloway College
University of London
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX
UK
j.m.rosal@rhul.ac.uk
Michael Spagat 1
Department of Economics
Royal Holloway College
University of London
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX
UK
M.Spagat@rhul.ac.uk
22nd August 2002
1Send editorial correspondence to: Professor Michael Spagat, Department of
Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20
OEX, United Kingdom, M.Spagat@rhul.ac.uk
Abstract
We study the problem of a central bank whose policy actions simultaneously
affect the information flow about its expectations-augmented Phillips curve
and its reputation for toughness in fighting inflation. In an environment
with an unknown relationship between inflation surprises and output, big
inflation surprises yield big short-term output gains and a strong information
flow. Yet optimal policy is very conservative because inflation surprises
yield information that increases the volatility of both future inflationary
expectations and inflation itself. In fact, the more there is that can be
learned about the Phillips curve the less does optimal policy aim towards
learning.
JEL Numbers: E5, E58, D8, D83
Key Words: Monetary Policy, Learning, Experimentation, Reputation,
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1 Introduction
Monetary authorities routinely conduct policy without full knowledge of the
underlying structure of their economy. Some uncertain factors are truly un-
knowable at the time policymakers set their instruments. Other structural
characteristics can be learned through experience. The possibility of learn-
ing about structural parameters creates potential for experimentation, i.e.,
policy partially aimed at generating useful information to improve the qual-
ity of future policy. For example, some have argued that US monetary policy
in the middle to late 1990s was concerned precisely with learning how far
interest rates could be lowered without kindling inflation, taking seriously
the possibility that the structural relationship between interest rates and
inflation might have shifted for the better [e.g. Bean (1999)].
Papers on experimentation and monetary policy include Bertocchi and
Spagat (1993), Balvers and Cosimano (1994), and Wieland (2000).1 Bertoc-
chi and Spagat (1993) provide a simple framework showing how the desire
to learn can bias monetary choices away from those yielding the highest
present payoff and in a direction that generates more information. Balvers
and Cosimano (1994) also consider active learning strategies for a central
bank but with the aim of helping the public to improve its inflation forecasts.
Wieland (2000) uses computational methods to analyze post-unification Ger-
man monetary policy, arguing that the country paid dearly from the failure
of the Bundesbank to experiment with looser monetary policy. These papers
fill an important gap in the literature by considering learning and experimen-
tation by central banks but are incomplete in the post-rational expectations
era because they leave the public inactive.
A key to activating the public is to give it rational inflationary expec-
tations. This can mean, in part, that the public observes the monetary
1Early work on experimentation outside the context of monetary policy includes
Prescott (1972) and Grossman, Kihlstron and Mirman (1977).
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authority, learns about its toughness toward inflation and incorporates this
information into its inflationary expectations as in Backus and Driffill (1984)
and Barro (1986).2 In this literature the public holds Bayesian beliefs about
central banker toughness. Weak bankers have an incentive to maintain an
illusion of toughness because once the public learns the truth it becomes
difficult to conduct effective monetary policy.
In the present paper we combine all of the above elements.3 There is
structural uncertainty about the relationship between inflation surprises and
output.4 In general, different inflation rates will yield different information
about this relationship. In addition, the public will form inflationary ex-
pectations rationally and this calculation will involve Bayesian updating of
beliefs about the toughness of the central bank.
Our results are opposite to those in the present experimentation litera-
ture. In the standard literature, e.g., Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) structural
uncertainty drives policy away from myopic optimality and in the direction
of generating more information. However, activating the public reverses this
conclusion, driving optimal policy to the other side of myopic optimality. In
other words, equilibrium policy in our framework tends to generate less in-
formation than the myopically optimal policy would. Moreover, the more
there is to learn, i.e., the greater is the structural uncertainty, the more
conservative will be the central bank’s behavior, shunning experimentation
increasingly as its ignorance grows.
2Kydland and Prescott (1977) is the early key reference in this literature but it does
not share our Bayesian approach.
3Caplin and Leahy (1996) combine a learning central bank with an active public in a
different context. Their bank gropes for an unknown interest rate that will cause enough
investment to pull the economy out of recession without generating so much as to overheat
the economy. The problem is, e.g., that investors will wait to invest if they believe the
bank will grope by gradually lowering interest rates.
4Throughout the paper we use the term structural uncertainty to mean potentially
learnable uncertainty about parameters of the economic model.
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Our work is loosely related to a large literature on learning and expec-
tations in macroeconomics surveyed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) that
has developed largely independently of the above learning literature. Most
of this work focuses on learning by the public but recent work considers
central bank learning. Evans and Honkapohja (2002) and Honkapohja and
Mitra (2002) study the issue of convergence to rational expectations equi-
libria when both the public and the central bank are learning. This whole
research line differs from the present paper in two substantial ways. First,
it uses “statistical” or “econometric” learning rather than the Bayesian ap-
proach of our paper. Second, it is interested primarily in long-run issues,
mainly convergence or non-convergence to rational expectations equilibria,
while we study inflation bias in a reputation and learning environment.5
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present a model
based on an expectations augmented Phillips curve with an unknown param-
eter governing the relationship between the inflation surprise and output.
There are two types of policymaker with one caring only about inflation
and the other caring about both inflation and output. The public holds
Bayesian beliefs about the relative likelihood of these two types as well as
about a structural parameter of the Phillips curb. The public’s inflation-
ary expectations are rational given its information. In section 3 we solve
the optimization problem for the weak policymaker, showing that he will
actively shun new information about the structural parameter because such
information is unusable and, in fact, positively harmful because it introduces
unwanted variability into the inflation rate. A nice intuition underpins this
result. The information of an inflation choice is increasing in the distance
of the inflation rate from the level the public expects, i.e., the bigger the
inflationary surprise the greater is the information. But a policy that aims
5Sargent (1999), on the other hand, does try to explain America’s postwar inflation
experience based on full learning dynamics for the Fed.
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at big inflationary surprises generates high volatility both in future inflation-
ary expectations and in future inflation that are, in equilibrium, mutually
reinforcing. Volatility is harmful so the central bank will strive to avoid big
surprises and will, consequently, learn little about the unknown structural
parameter.
In section 4 we study the equilibrium distinguishing between the case
where the weak policymaker can commit to not using new information from
the case where he cannot make such a commitment. There are two types
of equilibria. In one the weak policymaker acts tough and pools with the
strong one by choosing zero inflation. In the other equilibrium the weak
policymaker exploits the output-enhancing potential of the Phillips curve
while revealing his type to the detriment of future policy. The policymaker is
more likely to pool in the no-commitment case than he is in the commitment
case. We also show that the negative effect of new information puts pressure
on the weak policymaker to act tough, that is, structural uncertainty argues
for conservative monetary policy.
In section 5 we study in depth the tractable case where shocks to the
Phillips curve have a uniform distribution. We show that there is a mono-
tonic relationship between structural uncertainty and equilibria, i.e., for
parameter values related to low structural uncertainty the policymaker is
more likely to separate, and for those related to high structural uncertainty
the policymaker is more likely to pool. There is also an intermediate region
where equilibrium indeterminacy prevails, as the equilibrium can be either
pooling or separating depending on the public’s inflationary expectations.
We draw conclusions in section 6.
2 The Model
The model is a simple aggregate supply and demand framework augmented
by a monetary authority (the “policymaker”) with an unknown willingness
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to fight inflation. The novelty of this work is that, in additional to reputation
issues related to the policymaker, both the public and the policymaker have
incomplete information about one of the underlying structural parameters
of the economy.
2.1 The economic environment
The time horizon has two periods, t = 1, 2, and the following supply and
demand curves describe the economic environment:
yt = b(pit − piet ) + ²t (Supply) (1)
pit = mt (Demand) (2)
where yt is output growth, pit is actual inflation, piet is expected inflation and
mt is money growth, all in period t. The variable ²t is taken to be a period-
t random shock, and is distributed according to a cumulative distribution
F (.), with a differentiable density f(.) and with full support on [−²t, ²t],
where this support may well be the entire real line. For simplicity, it is
assumed that E(²t) = 0.
We assume that the supply curve’s slope, given by the parameter b, is
unknown by all agents and can take the values b and b, 0 < b < b. For
this lack of information, we use the term “structural uncertainty”. At the
outset, both the public and the policymaker attach a subjective probability
θ, θ ∈ (0, 1), to the event that b = b.
2.2 Policymakers
There are two types of policymakers, weak (ω) and strong (τ), differentiated
by their period-t payoff. These types are policymakers’ private information,
and the public attaches an initial probability p, 0 < p < 1, to the event of
the policymaker being of the weak type.
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Policymakers’ pay-offs are given by the following expression: Type Weak (ω) w
ω
t = yt − apit
2
2 with probability = p
Type Tough (τ) wτt = −apit
2
2 with probability = 1− p
where wit stands for the policymaker type i’s payoff in period t, with i = ω, τ .
We assume that a > 0.
The specification above aims to formalize the idea that a weak policy-
maker is the one who may consider exploring the short-run trade off between
inflation and output described by the supply curve. The tough policymaker,
however, cares only about inflation. This specification also formalizes the
fact that the policymakers dislike inflation variability, as both are risk averse
towards inflation. This feature is particularly important in our analysis.
2.3 Strategies and Equilibrium Definition
The simplicity of the model allows us to make relatively simple definitions
of strategies and equilibrium. Policymakers choose money growth in each
period, however, from equation 2 this is equivalent to choosing inflation
rates in both periods. The public rationally adjusts its expectations in both
periods. The equilibrium is defined as follows.
Consider a time-and-type-indexed profile of policymakers’ inflation strate-
gies {piit}, where i = ω, τ and t = 1, 2. Also, let {pie1, pie2(pi1, y1), p, α(pi1, y1), θ, µ(pi1, y1)}
be the profile of expectations and beliefs held by agents, such that {pie1, pie2(pi1, y1)}
are the public’s inflation expectations at t = 1, 2; {p, α(pi1, y1)} are respec-
tively the public’s period-1 and period-2 beliefs about the policymaker being
weak; and {θ, µ(pi1, y1)} are the period-1 and period-2 beliefs held by the
public and policymakers about b being b. Then the equilibrium requirements
are:
i) Given all beliefs, inflation strategies pi∗it, i = ω, τ and t = 1, 2, are
sequentially rational;
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ii) Whenever possible, for history (pi1, y1) period-2 beliefs α(pi1, y1) and
µ(pi1, y1)} are updated in a Bayesian fashion. Moreover, whenever
pi1 6= 0 we set α = 0; 6
iii) Inflation expectations pie2(pi1, y1) are equal to the expected inflation
strategies over both policymakers’ types, where expectations are taken
using the public’s beliefs in the relative probabilities of these types
α(pi1, y1).
Given the previous -somewhat informal- equilibrium definition, we pro-
ceed by solving the model backwards.
3 Optimal Choice for Policymakers
The main result of this section is that the weak policymaker tends towards
inflation levels that generate only small surprises for the public. This result
derives from the fact that the policymaker can only improve his information
about b by increasing the degree to which he upsets public expectations at
t = 1 while the bigger the surprise at time 1 the larger will be the variability
of inflation at t = 2.
3.1 The Tough Policymaker
The tough policymaker cares only about inflation, so his choice is trivial:
piτ1 = piτ2 = 0 (3)
These choices allow us to simplify the notation by dropping the subscript i
for type and referring to the weak policymaker’s inflation choices as simply
pi1 and pi2. Recall from the equilibrium definition that we assume that if
6This last requirement encapsulates the usual equilibrium requirement that agents
attach zero probability in their beliefs to the event that the tough policymaker may play
his dominated strategy piτ1 6= 0.
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the public observes pi1 different than zero it infers that the policy maker is
weak. Therefore, we can once more simplify the notation and redefine the
public’s beliefs over types at t = 2 solely as function of pi1, i.e., α(pi1), as
this variable becomes a sufficient statistic for the policymaker’s type.
3.2 The Weak Policymaker
3.2.1 Optimal Choice in Period 2
The public and the policymaker fully observe both output and inflation and
update their beliefs about b in a Bayesian fashion, the expression for this
belief being:
µ(y1, pi1;pie1) =
θfb
θfb + (1− θ)fb
(4)
where, recalling that f(.) is the density function of ²t, fb(y1, pi1;pie1) = f(y1−
b(pi1 − pie1)). Note that fb(., pi1, pie1) is the density function of y1 conditional
on b and pi1. As this density depends on pie1, this variable is also included
in the expression of µ(.). In fact, because the weak policymaker’s inflation
strategy at t = 2 will depend on µ(.), and hence on pie1, we make use of
similar notation for that variable, that is, the t = 2 inflation strategy is now
denoted by pi2(pi1, y1;pie1).
The period-2 optimal choice for the weak policymaker solves:7
Maxpi2
∫ ²
²
[µb(pi2 − pie2) + (1− µ)b(pi2 − pie2)− a
pi22
2
]f(²)d²
Intuitively, this means that the weak policymaker optimally weighs the con-
stant marginal effect of unexpected inflation on output against the increasing
marginal intensity of his dislike of inflation. The solution of this problem is:
pi∗2(y1, pi1;pi
e
1) =
µb+ (1− µ))b
a
=
E(b|y1, pi1, pie1)
a
(5)
Note that while pie2 appears in the policymaker’s optimization problem,
the solution to the problem does not depend on it. Nevertheless, period-2
7Notice that we have used the fact that E(²t) = 0.
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inflation expectations are still relevant because they affect the policymaker’s
payoff in period 2 and, hence, his behavior in period 1.
3.2.2 Inflation Expectations in Period 2
There are only two possible optimal choices for the weak policymaker in
period 1. Either he poses as the strong policymaker and sets pi1 = 0 or he
separates himself by choosing some pi1 6= 0. Define q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, as the
probability the weak policymaker sets pi1 = 0. Also, recalling that α(pi1) is
the public’s posterior belief about policymaker’s type being the weak one,
note that α(0) = qpqp+(1−p) , with 0 < α(0) < p, and that α(pi1) = 1 if pi1 6= 0.
Hence, the public’s period-2 inflation expectation is:
pie2 = αpi
∗
2. (6)
Therefore, using equations 5 and 6, one can show that the weak policy-
maker’s payoff in period 2 is:
W2(y1, pi1, pie1) = a[(1− α)−
1
2
](pi∗2)
2 (7)
3.2.3 The Learning Process
Figure 1 illustrates the process of learning about b when ²t has a compact
support and pie1 is fixed. The dashed region represents the distribution of
y1 conditional on b being the truth for each possible choice of pi1. The light
shaded region gives the same distribution conditional on b. For sufficiently
high or sufficiently low pi1 these regions do not overlap and all agents learn
the truth with probability 1. For pi1 close enough to pie1 the two support
regions intersect in the dark shaded region. When output falls into this
overlapping area there is only partial learning; when it falls outside there is
full learning. In the case where ²t has a support over the real line, the dark
shaded region becomes the whole (y1, pi1) plane.
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Figure 1: Learning Regions.
As one can see from equation 4, the likelihood ratio LR(y1, pi1, pie1) ≡
fb
f
b
plays a key role in the learning process, indicating how agents update beliefs
after observing y1. We introduce the following properties for the likelihood
function associated with the density function f(.) that apply throughout the
paper:
P.1) (Crossing property) There is a non-empty interval I such that LR(y1, pi1, pie1) =
1 if y1 ∈ I and LR(y1, pi1, pie1) 6= 1 if y1 /∈ I.
P.2) (Monotonicity) If pi1 ≥ pie1 the function LR(y1, pi1, pie1) = 1 is non-
increasing in y1 ; if pi1 ≤ pie1 it is non-decreasing.
Notice that in case where ²t has compact support, P1 restrains the anal-
ysis to the case where the two supply curves always overlap, which also re-
strains the feasible choices of pi1. Notice also that this property generalizes
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the analysis to shock distributions like the uniform, with regions where f(.)
is flat. Property P.2 means that in the case pi1 ≥ pie1 higher output growth
is associated with higher probability on b, and likewise, if pi1 ≤ pie1 higher
output growth is associated with higher probability on b. This property is
illustrated in figure 1.8
For simplification of the exposition, with the exception of section 5, prop-
erties P.1 and P.2 will be considered to hold strictly. That is, the interval
I will be given by a single point, and the likelihood function LR(y1, pi1, pie1)
will be taken to be strictly monotonic. Moreover, the support distribution
of the shock ²t will spread through the entire real line. As is illustrated dur-
ing the analysis of the uniform case (see section 5), these restrictions should
represent no loss of generality.
3.2.4 Optimal Choice in Period 1
We can express the full payoff function for the weak policymaker as:
W1(pi1, pie1) = [θb+(1−θ)b](pi1−pie1)−a
(pi1)2
2
+βa[(1−α)− 1
2
]Ey1 [(pi
∗
2)
2] (8)
where Ey1(.) stands for the expectation operator over all possible values of
y1, and β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. Then, the policymaker will choose pi1
to maximize this payoff function.
Suppose the weak policymaker decides to reveal his weakness in period
1, that is, pi1 6= 0 and α(pi1) = 1. The next result shows that his choice
will be biased towards inflation levels that generate small surprises for the
public. In other words, in period 2 the policymaker will be penalized to the
extent he has surprised the public in period 1.
Proposition 1 Consider the case where pi1 6= 0. If pi1 ≥ pie1, the func-
tion W2(y1, pi1, pie1) is strictly decreasing in pi1. If pi1 < pi
e
1 the function
8These properties hold for most standard distributions such as the uniform distribution
and the normal distribution.
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W2(y1, pi1, pie1) is strictly increasing in pi1.
9Ey1 [W2(y1, pi1, pi
e
1)], treated as a
function of pi1, is single peaked and achieves its maximum at pi1 = pie1.
The proof is in the appendix. The key is to show that the closer the
inflation level is to pie1 the lower is the volatility of period-2 inflation in
the sense of second order stochastic dominance. Since the central bank
has no information advantage over the public, the former will be unable
to explore the output-inflation trade-off on an improved basis in period 2
based on knowledge of b gleaned from inflation policies very different than
pie1 in period 1 . In fact, a better information flow about b will only increase
the volatility of both expected inflation and inflation itself. As the policy
maker is risk averse toward inflation, once he reached period 2 he will prefer
period-1 inflation levels that limit inflation volatility in period 2. In fact, the
proof basically relies on showing that from a period-1 perspective inflation
levels closer to pie1 dominates those further away from it.
Interestingly, proposition 1 implies that when the weak policymaker
chooses a separating strategy at t = 1, this policy will depend on expected
inflation at that time. Hence, the optimal separating policy will solve the
following trade-off. On the one hand the policymaker may try to take ad-
vantage of the immediate gains of high inflation, but on other hand he has to
minimize the effects of upsetting the public expectations over t = 2 expected
pay off.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
The equilibrium of the model is given by the strategies (pi∗1, pi∗2), beliefs µ(.)
and expectations α(.) as described in the previous section. In addition, the
condition pie1 = qppi
∗
1 must hold, where q is the probability that the weak
policymaker chooses a separating policy pi∗1 6= 0, and p is the prior probability
9Later we will show that pi1 will be either zero or strictly positive.
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that the policymaker is weak. For simplicity, we focus on the pure strategy
case, that is, either q = 1 (separating) or q = 0 (pooling).
The following result simplifies the analysis. Define piθ ≡ (θ)b+(1−θ)ba . This
is the inflation level that maximizes the first-period payoff in equation 8.
Lemma 1 Any equilibrium has to be such that 0 ≤ pi∗1 < piθ.
Proof:
In a pooling equilibrium pi∗1 = 0 < piθ, so the lemma is true. Hence we need
to consider just the case of separating equilibrium.
Notice that in any separating equilibrium α = 1, and so the effect of
second-period expected payoff on equation 8 is unambiguously negative. It
follows from that and from proposition 1 that for pi1 > pie1 the period-2
expected payoff is decreasing in pi1, and for pi1 < pie1 it is increasing on pi1.
Assume first that pi∗1 < 0. In this case, the weak policymaker strictly
prefers choosing pi1 = pie1 to any pi1 < pi
e
1, since both the expected period-2
payoff and the period-1 payoff are increasing in pi1 for all pi1 < pie1 when
pi1 < 0. However, since pie1 = ppi1, such a pi
∗
1 cannot be an equilibrium, and
so for any potential separating equilibrium, it must be that pi∗1 ≥ 0.
Assume now pi∗1 > piθ. In equilibrium pi∗1 > ppi∗1 = pie1 so the second-
period payoff is strictly decreasing in pi1 for all pi1 > pie1. It is also true that
the first-period payoff is strictly decreasing in pi1 for all pi1 > piθ. Hence,
there is some pi1, pi1 ≤ Max[piθ, pie1] < pi∗1, such that the policymaker is
strictly better off by choosing it rather that pi∗1. Hence, pi∗1 ≤ piθ. Moreover,
if pi1 = piθ the derivative of the first-period payoff with respect to pi1 is zero.
The second-period payoff is strictly decreasing in pi1 beginning at pi1 = pie1,
therefore if it is differentiable at piθ, the derivative must be strictly negative
at this point, so pi∗1 < piθ. But Ey1 [W2(y1, pi1, pie1)] is monotonic for pi1 ≥ pie1
so it must be differentiable almost everywhere and so the proof is finished.
2
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As we pointed out in the previous section information is harmful to the
policymaker. Therefore, it is plausible to imagine that he would like to either
blind himself to new information or else commit himself to ignore it. This
distinction is useful for studying the effect that learning has on the choice
of pi1. We proceed by comparing the optimal choice for the policymaker
of period-1 inflation when he cannot credibly commit to an information-
insensitive rule with what his optimal choice would be if he were allowed
to ignore or not respond to new information. We will refer to this latter,
case as the “commitment case” and the former case as the “no-commitment
case”.
Proposition 2 In the commitment case the weak policymaker is more will-
ing to reveal himself as weak than is the case in the no-commitment case,
i.e., in the former case pi1 6= 0 for a wider set of parameter values than in
the latter case.
Proof:
In any separating equilibrium, α = 1, hence the effect of expected period-2
on equation 8 is unambiguously negative. In the no-commitment case, any
period-2 optimal strategy pi∗2(.) is such that the following equality holds:
E(pi∗2(y1, pi1;pi
e
1)) =
E(E(b|y1, pi1;pie1))
a
=
E(b)
a
=
θb+ (1− θ)b
a
In the commitment situation, we have pi∗2 = piθ ≡ θb+(1−θ)ba . Then, from
Jensen’s inequality, it follows that (pi∗2)2 = (piθ)2 = [E(pi∗2(y1, pi1;pie1))]2 ≤
E[((pi∗2(y1, pi1;pie1))2], and the period-2 expected payoff in the commitment
case is always larger than that in the no-commitment case.10 As the period-
1 payoff is the same in both situations, for any separating inflation rate
10Note that the commitment period-2 strategy takes no argument. This was done on
purpose, as it should not depend on either y1, pi1 nor pi
e
1. For more details, see the
discussion following proposition 3.
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0 < pi1 ≤ piθ the weak policy maker will enjoy a larger overall payoff in the
commitment case than in the non-commitment case.
The result then follows from the observation that the pooling payoff for
the weak policy maker is the same regardless of the possibility of commit-
ment. This is because in a pooling equilibrium pie = pi1 = 0, implying that
LR(.) = 1 and, hence (4), µ(.) = θ for every y1. Since nothing about b is
learned in a pooling equilibrium the possibility of committing to ignore new
information is irrelevant in this case.
2
The next result gives a necessary and sufficient condition applicable to
the commitment case ensuring that the only equilibrium is a pooling one.
Note that, given result 2, this condition is also a sufficient condition for the
equilibrium to be a pooling one in the no-commitment case.
Proposition 3 In the commitment case, the weak policymaker chooses the
pooling strategy pi1 = 0 if and only if (1−p)β > 12 . Moreover, if this condition
is satisfied the weak policy maker will never choose a separating strategy in
the no-commitment case.
Proof:
In the commitment situation the weak policymaker always sets pi∗2 = piθ ≡
θ(b)+(1−θ)(b)
a . Hence, if he separates in period 1,W1(pi
θ, pie1) = −apie1piθ+a(12−
β
2 )(pi
θ)2, and if instead he pools, W1(0, pie1) = −apie1piθ+a[(1−p)− 12 ]β(piθ)2.
Thus, the pooling strategy dominates the separating one if and only if:
W1(piθ, pie) < W1(0, pie)⇐⇒ 12 < (1− p)β
2
As the proofs of the propositions 2 and 3 suggest, there is a impor-
tant distinction between the commitment situation and the no-commitment
15
situation. As in many pure reputation model, in the commitment situation
the weak policymaker’s strategy does not depend on period-1 inflationary
expectations. In particular, the optimum separating strategy will be the one
that maximizes the period-1 pay off, pi∗1 = piθ, and will not depend on the
period-2 pay off. However, as noted in the previous section, this is in marked
contrast to the no-commitment case, where the expected t = 1 inflation pie1
plays a key role in case the weak policy maker decides to separate, as this
variable determines how much will be learned, and hence how much period-2
policy will fluctuate.
To sum up this section we note that forces of conservatism work on the
weak policymaker in two distinct ways. First, they push him toward of
zero-inflation pooling equilibrium. Second, even if he separates, creating a
positive inflation surprise, he still chooses less inflation than the myopically
optimal level, piθ. This last result runs against the standard one in the
experimentation literature that suggest the bank should adjust from piθ in
the direction of more information, i.e., up.
5 The Uniform Case
To gain precision and clarify the exposition, we now consider a case that
yields closed-form solutions. The analysis illustrates the effects of the struc-
tural uncertainty over the supply curve’s slope on the equilibrium outcome.
In particular, we identify a region in the parameter space representing struc-
tural uncertainty where the unique equilibrium is a pooling one, another re-
gion with a unique separating equilibrium and third region where there are
multiple equilibria, with the pooling and separating equilibria co-existing.
Let ²t be distributed uniformly, that is, f(²t) = 12² if ²t ∈ [−², ²], and 0
otherwise. Thus, the likelihood ratio is such that LR(y1, pi1, pie1) = 1 if y1
is in the partial learning region (the dark shaded region in figure 1), and
LR(y1, pi1, pie1) is either 0 or∞, depending on whether y1 falls respectively in
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the b or b full-learning zones (the dashed and light shaded regions in figure
1).11 Equation 4 for the posterior probabilities becomes:
µ(pi1, y1;pie1) =

θ if non-learning region
1 if b full learning region
0 if b full learning region
Equation 5 for period-2 inflation pi∗2(.) specializes to:
pi∗2(pi1, y1;pi
e
1) =

piθ2 ≡ θb+(1−θ)ba non-learning region
pi
b
2 ≡ ba if b full learning region
pib2 ≡ ba if b full learning region
It is also useful to calculate the probability the economy falls in the non-
learning region, P (pi1, pie1). The expression for this is:
P (pi1, pie1) =
 Max{1−
(∆b)(pi1−pi1e)
2² , 0} if pi1 ≥ pi1e
Max{1 + (∆b)(pi1−pi1e)2² , 0} if pi1 < pi1e
where ∆b ≡ b− b. Note that if pi1 ≤ pi1 ≡ pi1e− 2²∆b or if pi1 ≥ pi1 ≡ pi1e+ 2²∆b
then there is complete learning with probability 1.12 It follows that P (pi1, pie1)
has a triangular shape, where the upper vertex is at pie1, the side vertices are
pi and pi, and its support is the interval [pi1, pi1]
Given the expressions for µ(.), and pi∗2(.) and P (pi1, pie1), equation 8 be-
comes:
W1(pi1, pie1) = api
θ(pi1 − pie1)− a
pi21
2
+ βa[(1− α)− 1
2
] ·
·{[θ(pib2)2 + (1− θ)(pib2)2]− P (pi1, pie1) [θ(pib2)2 + (1− θ)(pib2)2 − (piθ2)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
}
(9)
Note that the constant γ in 9 is the unconditional variance of period-2
inflation policy, and that a2γ is the unconditional variance of b. As one can
11The partial learning zone implies no learning at all in this case precisely because the
likelihood ratio is constant in this region.
12In figure 1, these thresholds are the right and left extremes of the dark shaded region.
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readily see, the appearance of γ in that expression - along with the triangular
shape P (pi1, pie1) - is just a version of result 1 to the current specialization of
the model. That is, if the policymaker separates and α = 1, it follows from
γ > 0 that pi1’s closer to pie1 will be preferred to those farther away.
Suppose the weak policymaker separates and sets pi1 > 0. He will then
maximize equation 9 with respect to pi1, the first order condition being:
dW1
dpi1
= (piθ − pi1) + dP (pi1, pi
e
1)
dpi1
γ
β
2
≥ 0. (10)
Note that this function is not continuous at the points pi1 = pie1, pi1 and pi1,
and hence the equality does not necessarily hold. More precisely, note that
dP (pi1, pie1)
dpi1
=

∆b
2² ≥ 0 if pi1 ∈ [pi1, pie1]
−∆b
2² ≤ 0 if pi1 ∈ [pie1, pi1]
0 if pi1 /∈ (pie, pie)
The discontinuity stems from the compactness of ²t and appears in figure 1
in the form of kinks on the edges of the dark shaded region when pi1 is either,
pie1, pi1 or pi1.
13
Define φ ≡ γβ∆b4² > 0. There are three possible maximizing points for
equation 9, depending on the parameters piθ and φ, and on pie1. If pi
θ−φ > pie1,
the possible solutions are piθ−φ, if this policy is on the support of P (pi1, pie1),
and piθ, if this policy falls off the support of the same function. This is so
because in this case these two policies satisfy the first order condition of the
separating problem.
If piθ − φ ≤ pie1, the possible solutions are pie1 and piθ. In fact, if this
inequality holds, it follows from equation 10 that dW1dpi1 > 0 at pi
θ − φ, so the
maximum of W1(pi1, pie1) within the support of P (pi1, pi
e
1) is achieved at pi
e
1.
13It may appear that at pie1, pi1 and pi1 the derivative
dP (pi1,pi
e
1)
dpi1
is ill defined, as it may
assume different values depending on the direction of the approximations. However, one
should note that at these points we are slightly abusing the definition of the derivative
and extending it to the case where the left hand and right hand derivatives are different.
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Moreover, for the same reason as in the previous paragraph, if piθ falls outside
the support of P (pi1, pie1) it is also a possible solution for the separating
problem.
For simplification of the analysis, we will restrict the range of the study
to the case where piθ ≤ 2²∆b , that is, we require the demand shock to be large
relative to the difference of the possible supply curve slopes. Given this
assumption, we have that piθ is always on the support of P (pi1, pie1) in any
equilibrium. This is so, because by this assumption together with lemma 1
imply that pi1 = pie1 +
2²
∆b >
2²
∆b ≥ piθ as pie1 ≥ 0. Note also that pi1 = piθ − φ
will also be on the support of P (pi1, pie1) , as pi
θ − φ < piθ. Hence, under the
stated assumption the first order condition of the separating problem will be
satisfied with equality only for piθ +φ > pie1, and pi
θ is never a policymaker’s
best action.
It is worth noting that the assumption piθ ≤ 2²∆b creates a similar en-
vironment to the one we would have if the support of ²t were unbounded,
that is, a case where the interval I in the definition of property P.2 is al-
ways non-empty. In these environments any separating policy implies some
learning, driving the policymaker to chose inflation lower than piθ, the opti-
mal separating policy in the commitment case. In contrast, if piθ > 2²∆ then
there will always be a threshold pi1 above which the policymaker receivers no
additional information about b, making it possible that piθ could be optimal.
We now consider the effect of mean-preserving risk spreads on the prior
distribution of b on the equilibrium. That is, we gradually increase γ while
keeping the expected value of b constant. These mean-preserving spreads
on b will increase the value of φ, as both γ and ∆b will increase, forcing the
weak policy maker to chose lower levels of pi1 in case of separation as piθ−φ
decreases. Moreover, mean-preserving spreads also decreases the willingness
of the weak policymaker to separate himself from the tough one.14
14Referring to figure 1, this exercise implies “squeezing” the non-informative region,
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The following proposition fully characterizes the equilibrium within the
range of study.
Proposition 4 Suppose that (1− p)β < 12 and that piθ − φ ≥ 0 . There are
three equilibrium regions in (p, γ)-space, where changes in γ correspond to
mean-preserving spreads on b:
i) A unique equilibrium region with a separating equilibrium pi∗1 = piθ −φ
and pie1 = p(pi
θ − φ).
ii) A unique equilibrium region with a pooling equilibrium pi∗1 = 0 and
pie = 0.
iii) A multiple equilibria region, with a separating equilibrium as in i) and
a pooling equilibrium as in ii).
We leave the details of the proof to the appendix but give here its main
argument. As pointed out above, there are two policies to compare, a pooling
one with pi1 = 0, and separating one with pi1 = piθ−φ. The proof consists just
in comparing W1(piθ−φ, p(piθ−φ)) with W1(0, p(piθ−φ)) when pi1 = piθ− θ
and pie1 = p(pi
θ− θ) is the candidate equilibrium, and likewise, W1(0, 0) with
W1(piθ − φ, 0), when pi1 = pie = 0 is the candidate equilibrium.
We summarize the main features of the equilibrium in figure 2. The
figure describes the equilibrium for different mean preserving spreads on b
and for different prior probabilities p of the policy maker being of weak type.
We know from previous discussion that the larger is γ the less willing the
policymaker will be to separate. In addition, and in common with standard
reputation models, the larger is p the more willing to separate is the weak
policy maker. Hence, the figure captures the basic tension between these
two forces in the model.
increasing the information content of larger pi1’s as it moves away from pi
e
1.
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Consider first the case where the policy maker can commit to ignore
any new information. For this situation, the relevant line is the vertical
line at p = 1 − 12β . From result 2, we know that to the left of this line
there is a unique pooling equilibrium, and to the right a unique separating
equilibrium. That is, the possible deterrent effect of high γ′s have no bite
in the commitment case and the policymaker is only concerned with his
reputation.
Matters change considerably when the policy maker is unable to commit
against any new information. Define γpiθ as the value of γ such that piθ = φ.
This line divides the commitment separating area into two regions. For the
region above this γpiθ , lemma 1 implies the pooling equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium, which in the present context accounts to say that the deter-
rence effect of future information discovery is so strong that no separating
equilibrium arises, regardless of p. For the region under this horizontal line,
the result 4 holds, according to which this region can be separated into three
subregions. The region at the bottom (dark shaded) where the separating
equilibrium (piθ − φ, p(piθ − φ)) is the unique equilibrium; the region at the
top, where the pooling equilibrium is the unique one; and the region in the
middle of these two, where the two equilibria co-exist.
The main properties of the regions in between the straight lines p = 1− 12β
and γ = γpiθ (proven in the appendix) are as follows. Define Bp(p, γ) as the
set of (p, γ) such thatW1(0, 0) =W1(piθ−φ(γ), 0), and analogously Bs(p, γ)
as set of (p, γ) such that W1(piθ − φ(γ), p(piθ − φ(γ))) =W (0, p(piθ − φ(γ))).
We show in the appendix that the pooling equilibrium region lies above
Bp(p, γ) and that the points (1 − 12β , 0) and (1, γpiθ) belong to Bp(p, γ).15
We also show that the separating region lies below Bs(p, γ) and that the
points (1− 12β , 0) and (1, γpiθ) belong to this region as well. Finally, we have
15It is also show in the appendix that Bp(p, γ) implicitly defines an increasing relation-
ship between γ and p.
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Figure 2: Slope Mean-Preserving Spread (piθ=constant)
the property that the line Bp(p, γ) lies below the line Bs(p, γ), implying
that the multiple equilibrium region is made up of the intersection of the
separating equilibrium region and the pooling equilibrium region.
In light of these properties, the intuition for figure 2 is clear. As in pure
reputation models, the higher is p the more likely is the weak policy maker
to separate. In the present context, if γ = 0, the same result is replicated
here. However, as γ grows larger, the learning effect grows in importance,
shrinking the set of p for which separation occurs. In fact, by proposition 4,
for values of γ high enough, the learning effect is so strong that separation
occurs only when the policymaker is quite likely to be weak.
There does exist a region with multiple equilibria in between the sepa-
rating and the pooling regions, where the combinations of γ and p are such
that neither the learning effect through γ nor the reputation effect through
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p are strong enough to dominate. If it were not for the dependence of the
learning effect on expected inflation, as shown in proposition 1, we would
observe a sudden change from a separating to a pooling equilibrium as γ
increases, rather than having the two equilibria co-exist. That is, we would
have Bp(p, γ) = Bs(p, γ). But, as argued above, this is not case, as the
curve Bp(p, γ) lies above the curve Bs(p, γ). Within this multiple equilib-
rium region the prevailing equilibrium may well depend on exogenous factors
which can coordinate agents inflationary expectations either to pie1 = 0 or
pie1 = p(pi
θ − φ). However, in either case the expectations will be such that
the weak policy maker will be forced to make a choice such that those ex-
pectations will necessarily be fulfilled.
Finally, consider mean-preserving spreads on the shock ²1. The defini-
tion φ ≡ γβ∆b4² and the proof of proposition 4 make clear that these will
make policy less conservative in two senses. First, there will be separating
equilibria for a larger set of parameter values and pooling equilibria for a
smaller set. Second, even in separating equilibria mean-preserving spreads
push pi∗1 closer to piθ. In other words, increasing the variability of the shocks
has the opposite effect of increasing the spread on the b’s.
6 Conclusion
We can envision various extensions of this work that could change or modify
some of the results. For example, giving the central bank more limited
control over monetary policy would be more realistic and might give it some
scope for experimenting without completely losing its reputation. Another
change that might lead to more experimentation would be to give the bank
some scope for maintaining an information advantage over the public.16
16In this context some recent literature of the possible value of having central banks that
are not completely transparent to the public could be relevant [Jensen (2001), Gersbach
(2002)].
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Despite these caveats, it is still interesting to take the model in its present
form seriously and think about what it might imply about policy. In this
spirit we emphasize our result that high structural uncertainty is grounds for
conservatism. This idea sounds similar to that of Brainard (1967), recently
reemphasized in Blinder (1998) who offers the following advice for central
bankers: “...Estimate how much you need to tighten or loosen monetary pol-
icy to ‘get it right.’ Then do less.” (Blinder[1998], p. 17]. However, while
our conclusion is similar to Brainard’s our reasoning is different. Brainard’s
parameter uncertainty is fundamentally unlearnable while ours is. Thus, our
model suggests that central bankers who care about output should be con-
servative out of fear of learning too much about how the economy functions,
and thereby introducing excessive instability. The less a central bank knows
about economic structure the more conservative it should be ceteris paribus.
Thus, new central banks, such as the European Central Bank and those for
economies in transition from communism, should be among the most conser-
vative whereas well-established banks such as the US Federal Reserve Bank
can afford to be somewhat more experimental in their policies.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the case where pi1 ≥ pie1. The opposite case being similar. Take
pi′′1 > pi′1 ≥ pie1. Since the period-2 payoff is given by a concave function in
pi2 when α = 1, it is enough to prove that pi∗2(y1, pi′′1 ;pie1) is a mean-preserving
spread of pi∗2(y1, pi′1;pie1).
Consider the function g(pi1) as defined below:
g(pi1) =
∫ w
−∞
P (pi∗2(y1, pi
′
1;pi
e
1) ≤ w)dw (A.1)
for any w. To prove that pi∗2(y1, pi′′1) is a mean-preserving spread of pi∗2(y1, pi′1)
it is sufficient to prove:∫ w
−∞
[P (pi∗2(y1, pi
′
1;pi
e
1)− P (pi∗2(y1, pi′′1 ;pie1))]dw = g(pi′1)− g(pi′′1) < 0
since E(pi∗2(y1, pi1;pie1)) =
θb+(1−θ)b
a for every pi1 (see Laffont [1989], pp. 25-
26). Moreover, since pi′′1 > pi′1, it is sufficient to prove
dg(pi1)
dpi1
> 0 for every
pi1 ≥ pie1.
Consider first a few useful expressions. Recall that the expression for the
likelihood function is L(y1, pi1;pie1) =
fb(.)
f
b
(.) , where fb(.) ≡ f(y1 − b(pi1 − pie1)).
We calculate the derivatives:
∂LR(y1, pi1, pie1)
∂y1
= [fb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
− fb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
]/(fb(.))2 (A.2)
∂LR(y1, pi1, pie1)
∂pi1
= −[bfb(.)
∂fb
∂y1
− bfb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
]/(fb(.))2 (A.3)
Note that ∂LR(y1,pi1,pi
e
1)
∂y1
< 0 if and only if ψ ≡ [fb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
−fb ∂fb∂y1 ] < 0. Recall
that pi∗2(.) is decreasing in LR(.) (equations 4 and 5) and the LR(.) is strictly
decreasing in y1 by property P.2. Thus, pi∗2(y1, pi1;pi∗2) is strictly increasing
in y1 and strictly decreasing in pi1.
Define h(w;pi1;pie1) = {y1;pi∗2(y1, pi1;pie1) = w}. Then we have that this
function is well defined for w within the range of possible period-2 inflation
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rates because of property P.2. To calculate ∂h(w,pi1)∂pi1 precisely, first re-write
pi∗2(.) = [LR(.)bθ + b(1 − θ)]/[LR(.)θ + (1 − θ)] and the use this expression
to obtain the following derivatives:
∂pi∗2
∂pi1
=
1
ρ
{∂LR(.)
∂pi1
bθ[LR(.)θ + (1− θ)]− ∂LR(.)
∂pi1
θ[LR(.)bθ + b(1− θ)]}
(A.4)
∂pi∗2
∂y1
=
1
ρ
{∂LR(.)
∂y1
bθ[LR(.)θ + (1− θ)]− ∂LR(.)
∂y1
θ[LR(.)bθ + b(1− θ)]}
(A.5)
where ρ = [LRθ + (1 − θ)]2. It follows from using equations A.2, A.3
and A.4, A.5 and that:
∂h(w, pi1)
∂pi1
=
dy1
dpi1
= −
∂pi∗2
∂pi1
∂pi∗2
∂y1
= −
∂LR(.)
∂pi1
∂LR(.)
∂y1
=
[bfb(.)
∂fb
∂y1
− bfb(.)∂fb(.)∂y1 ]
[fb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
− fb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ
(A.6)
Given the function h(w, pi1) = y1, equation A.1 can be written as follows:
g(pi1) =
∫ w
−∞
P (y1 ≤ h(w, pi1))dw
and from that follows:
dg(pi1)
dpi1
=
∫ w
−∞
∂P (y1 ≤ h(w, pi1))
∂pi1
dw (A.7)
Notice that the expression for P (y1 ≤ h(w, pi1)) is as below:
P (y1 ≤ h(w, pi1)) =
∫ h(w,pi1)
−∞
θf(y1 − b(pi1 − pie)) + (1− θ)f(y1 − b(pi1 − pie))dy1
Hence, by applying Leibniz’s rule:
∂P (y1 ≤ h(w1, pi1))
∂pi1
=
{θf(h(w, pi1)− b(pi1 − pie1)) + (1− θ)f(h(w, pi1)− b(pi1 − pie1))}
∂h(w, pi1)
∂pi1
−{
∫ h(w,pi1)
−∞
bθf ′(y1 − b(pi1 − pie1)) + b(1− θ)f ′(y1 − b(pi1 − pie1))dy1 =
{θf(h(w1, pi1)− b(pi1 − pie1)) + (1− θ)f(h(w, pi1)− b(pi1 − pie1))}
∂h(w, pi1)
∂pi1
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−[bθf(h(w, pi1)− b(pi1 − pie1)) + b(1− θ)f(h(w, pi1)− b(pi1 − pie1))] =
θ(
∂h(w, pi1)
∂pi1
− b)fb(h(.), pi1;pie1) + (1− θ)(
∂h(w, pi1)
∂pi1
− b)fb(h(.), pi1;pie1)
(A.8)
Using equation A.6, we arrive at expressions for the coefficients of the equa-
tion A.8:
∂h(w, pi1)
∂pi1
− b = −[(∆b)fb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
]/ψ
∂h(w, pi1)
∂pi1
− b = −[(∆b)fb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
]/ψ
where ∆b = b−b > 0, ψ < 0 are as defined above. These expressions cannot
be signed immediately because of the
∂f
b
(.)
∂y1
and
∂fb(.)
∂y1
terms. However, using
the definition of ψ, we can re-write these expressions as:
∂h(w, pi1)
∂pi1
− b = −∆b
[(fb
∂fb
∂y1
)/(fb
∂f
b
∂y1
)]− 1
(A.9)
∂h(w, pi1)
∂pi1
− b = −∆b
[1− (fb ∂fb∂y1 )/(fb
∂fb
∂y1
)]
(A.10)
Now notice that:
ψ ≡ [fb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
− fb(.)
∂fb(.)
∂y1
] < 0⇐⇒ (fb
∂fb
∂y1
)/(fb
∂fb
∂y1
)] > 1
Therefore both equations A.9 and A.10 are positive. It follows that
equation A.8 is positive and so is equation A.7.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
We start by restating the value function for the weak policy maker, since
the proof heavily depends on it:
W1(pi1, pie1) = api
θ(pi1 − pie1)− a
pi21
2
+ βa[(1− α)− 1
2
] ·
·{[θ(pib2)2 + (1− θ)(pib2)2]− P (pi1, pie1) [θ(pib2)2 + (1− θ)(pib2)2 − (piθ2)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
}
(A.11)
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where
P (pi1, pie1) =
 Max{1−
(∆b)(pi1−pi1e)
2² , 0} if pi1 ≥ pi1e
Max{1 + (∆b)(pi1−pi1e)2² , 0} if pi1 < pi1e
.
Define as in section 0.4 φ = γ∆b4² and note that for mean-preserving spreads
on b, dφ(γ)dγ > 0.
Item i):
For this region it must be thatW1(piθ−φ, p(piθ−φ)) ≥W1(0, p(piθ−φ)).
This relationship holds if and only if the following set of inequalities hold:
(piθ)2
2
− (φ)
2
2
− β
2
[θ(pib)2 + (1− θ)(pib)2)− P (piθ − φ, p(piθ − φ))γ]
≥ β[(1− p)− 1
2
][θ(pib)2 + (1− θ)(pib)2)− P (0, p(piθ − φ))γ]⇐⇒
(piθ)2
2
− (φ)
2
2
− β
2
[P (0, p(piθ − φ))− P (piθ − φ, p(piθ − φ))]γ
≥ β(1− p)[1− [P (0, p(piθ + φ))]γ + (piθ)2]
Note that from the expression for P (pi1, pie1),
β
2γ[P (0, p(pi
θ − φ)) − P (piθ −
φ, p(piθ−φ))] = φ[(piθ−φ)(1−2p) and γβ[1−P (0, p(piθ−φ))] = 2pφ(piθ−φ).
Substituting these equalities into the last inequality above, we have a new
set of relationships:
(piθ)2
2
− (φ)
2
2
− φ(1− 2p)(piθ − φ) ≥ 2(1− p)pφ(piθ − φ) + β(1− p)(piθ)2
⇐⇒ (pi
θ − φ)2
2
+ 2p2(piθ − φ)φ− β(1− p)(piθ)2 ≥ 0
(A.12)
Define Bs(p, φ) as when inequality A.12 holds as an equality. Since φ is a
(increasing) function of γ, define as well Bs(p, γ) ≡ Bs(p, φ(γ)). Then the
following properties follow:
1. The inequality A.12 holds for γ = 0 and every p ≥ 1− 12β .
To see this, take φ = 0. Then, it is easy to see that p = 1− 12β is the
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solution of the equation Bs(p, 0), and for every p ≥ 1 − 1β inequality
A.12 holds. But γ = 0 implies φ = 0, thus γ = 0 implies that A.12
holds for all p ≥ 1− 12β .
2. Define γpiθ as the value of γ such that piθ = φ. Then if p = 1, the
inequality A.12 holds for every γ ≤ γpiθ .
Take p = 1 and note that in this case φ = piθ is the solution of the
equation Bs(1, φ), and that inequality A.12 holds for every φ ≤ piθ.
As dφdγ > 0, for p = 1 there is a number γpiθ such that A.12 holds for
every γ ≤ γpiθ , where γpiθ is as defined above.
Notice that the definitions for Bs(p, γ) made here and the one in section
3 are exactly the same. Hence, from the properties just demonstrated, it
follows that the curve Bs(p, γ) is as in figure 2, and so the separation region
is as depicted there.
Item ii):
In this case, we have to analyze the values of p and γ in the (p, γ)
space such that W1(0, 0) ≥ W1(piθ − φ, 0) holds. Using the value function’s
expression, we have that the following set of inequalities must hold:
β[(1− p)− 1
2
](piθ)2 ≥ (pi
θ)2
2
− (φ)
2
2
− β
2
[θ(pib)2 + (1− θ)(pib)2 − P (piθ − φ, 0)]
⇐⇒ β[(1− p)](piθ)2 ≥ (pi
θ)2
2
− (φ)
2
2
− β
2
[1− P (piθ − φ, 0)]γ
As γ β2 [1−P (piθ −φ, 0)] = φ(piθ −φ), the inequality above can be written as
below:
β[(1− p)](piθ)2 − (pi
θ − φ)2
2
≥ 0 (A.13)
As in the previous item, define Bp(p, φ) as when inequality A.13 holds as an
equality, and set Bp(p, γ) ≡ Bp(p, φ(γ)). Again, following steps analogous
as those in item1, the following properties can be shown:
1. If γ = γpiθ (that is, piθ = φ), the inequality A.13 holds for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
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2. If γ = 0 (φ = 0), inequality A.13 holds for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1− 12β .
3. The curve Bp(p, γ) defines a function implicitly, p(γ), such that dp(γ)dγ >
0. In fact, from Bp(p, φ) we can find that dpdφ =
piθ−φ
β(piθ)2
> 0. As dφdγ > 0,
then dpdγ > 0.
Hence, the pooling equilibrium region is as depicted in figure 2 and we
verify that Bp(p, γ) as defined in section 5 is just Bp(p, γ) = Bp(p, φ(γ)).
Item iii):
Take any point (pˆ, γˆ) that satisfies the equation Bp(pˆ, φ(γˆ)). As φ(θ −
φ) > 0, it follows that inequality A.12 is satisfied for (pˆ, φ(γˆ)). Thus, the
set of (p, γ) that satisfies Bp(p, γ) lies below the one that satisfies Bs(p, γ).
Moreover, the multiple equilibria region is non-empty and lies on the in-
tersection of the pooling and the separating regions, as indicated in figure
2.
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